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Debiasing Through Law 
 
Christine Jolls* 
Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
Abstract 
 
Human beings are often boundedly rational. In the face of 
bounded rationality, the legal system might attempt either to 
“debias law,” by insulating legal outcomes from the effects of 
boundedly rational behavior, or instead to “debias through law,” 
by steering legal actors in more rational directions. Legal analysts 
have focused most heavily on insulating outcomes from the 
effects of bounded rationality. In fact, however, a large number of 
actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in 
debiasing through law – to help people reduce or even eliminate 
boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts 
promise to avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with 
regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given 
and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. 
This paper offers both a general description of debiasing through 
law and an account of how such debiasing does or could work to 
address central legal questions across a range of areas, from 
consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion 
is also devoted to the risk of government manipulation that is 
sometimes created when debiasing through law is employed..  
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Introduction 
 
A growing body of legal analysis focuses on how human behavior 
deviates systematically from what would be predicted by the traditional 
economic assumption of unbounded rationality.1 To the extent that legal rules 
are designed on the basis of their anticipated effects on behavior, bounded 
rationality is obviously relevant to the formulation of legal policy. But an 
important and little addressed question is precisely how it is relevant to the 
formulation of legal policy. The most obvious possibility is that, given a 
demonstration of the existence and importance of a particular aspect of 
bounded rationality, the law should be structured to presume the existence of 
that particular shortcoming in human behavior.  
 
Most existing work in behavioral law and economics is of this 
character. Consider, for instance, the large literature examining the belief by 
boundedly rational consumers that potentially risky products are substantially 
safer than they in fact are. In the presence of such beliefs, the law might – 
and to some degree does – respond by adopting heightened standards of 
manufacturer liability for consumer products (e.g., Hanson and Kysar 
1999a:1511-12). Or consider the argument that “Monday morning quarter-
backing” by judges or juries adversely affects judgments reached by these 
decision makers on matters of corporate law, so that corporations are held 
liable for bad events even if preventing those events would have been 
extremely difficult (Rachlinski 1998:620-21). If so, then the law could 
respond, as indeed it has with the “business judgment rule,” by largely 
vitiating the liability of corporate law actors, who would otherwise be 
vulnerable to such second-guessing on the part of adjudicators. More 
generally, rules and institutions might be, and frequently are, designed so that 
legal outcomes do not fall prey to problems of bounded rationality.   
 
Boundedly rational behavior thus might be taken to justify a strategy 
of insulation, attempting to protect legal outcomes from falling victim to 
bounded rationality. To date, most treatments of bounded rationality in law 
have been of this character. Strategies for insulation can be characterized as a 
method for “debiasing law.”  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998), Korobkin and Ulen 
(2000), Parisi and Smith (2004), Sunstein (2000), and law review symposia 
in Northwestern University Law Review (2003) and Vanderbilt Law Review 
(1998). 
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A quite different possibility – one that has received much less 
attention in law and elsewhere – is that legal policy may respond best to 
problems of bounded rationality not by insulating legal outcomes from its 
effects, but instead by operating directly on the boundedly rational behavior 
and attempting to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it. We describe 
legal policy in this category as “debiasing through law.” Debiasing through 
law will often be a less intrusive, more direct, and more democratic response 
to the problem of bounded rationality.  
 
In fact there exists a substantial, empirically-oriented social science 
literature on prospects for debiasing of individuals after a demonstration of a 
given form of bounded rationality.2 But empirical findings on these forms of 
debiasing have made only limited appearances in the legal literature,3 and 
equally important, social scientists interested in such forms of debiasing have 
generally not investigated the possibility of achieving them through law. In 
many important settings, empirical evidence suggests the substantial potential 
of these sorts of debiasing strategies, and from a legal policy perspective it is 
obviously important to ask about the role that law can play in facilitating such 
debiasing. That is our major focus in this paper.  
 
When debiasing through law has been discussed in the legal literature, 
the treatment has focused on existing or proposed steps taken in procedural 
rules governing adjudication by judges or juries. A well-known example 
stems from the work by Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel 
Issacharoff and Colin Camerer (1995) on the tendency of litigants to evaluate 
likely outcomes, as well as questions of fairness, in ways that systematically 
serve their own interests. Thus, for instance, these authors find that 
individuals assigned to the role of the plaintiff and presented with exactly the 
same information as is presented to individuals assigned to the role of the 
defendant offer far higher estimates of the likelihood of a plaintiff victory in a 
lawsuit. Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1997) find, however, that in 
an experimental setting, this self-serving bias may be eradicated by requiring 
litigants to consider the weaknesses in their case or reasons that the judge 
                                                 
2 Leading examples include Fischhoff (1982), Sanna, Schwarz and Stocker 
(2002), and Weinstein and Klein (2002). Many other illustrations appear in 
the body of the paper.  
3 As noted in the text just below, where debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors has been examined in the legal literature, the focus has been on 
achieving debiasing through procedural rules governing adjudication by 
judges or juries. We discuss several examples below.  
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might rule against them. In these circumstances, individuals in the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s roles have similar views on likely trial outcomes and fair 
settlements.4 The present paper, by contrast, gives primary emphasis to a 
different and broader form of debiasing through law – a category we call 
“debiasing through substantive law.” 
 
The central idea of debiasing through substantive law is that in some 
cases it may be desirable to structure the substance of law – not merely the 
procedures by which the law is applied in an adjudicative setting – with an 
eye toward debiasing those who suffer from bounded rationality. Through a 
series of examples from areas of law outside of adjudicative procedure, we 
hope to show that the prospect of reducing bounded rationality through 
substantive law holds previously unrecognized promise for both 
understanding and improving the legal system. 
 
Section 1 below begins by offering a general description of debiasing 
through law. Our analysis emphasizes the basic distinction between debiasing 
of boundedly rational actors and the provision of incentives – another 
important instrument for affecting actors’ behavior.  
 
Section 2 focuses on debiasing through substantive law. It illustrates 
the general scope and power of this form of debiasing by describing the role 
it does or could play in addressing important questions across a range of legal 
domains, from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Our 
analysis of debiasing through substantive law contrasts with the almost 
reflexive focus in the existing legal literature in these domains on “debiasing 
law” solutions to problems of bounded rationality.   
   
Section 3 explores some of the normative questions raised by 
debiasing through law (whether achieved through procedural rules or through 
substantive law). Compared to the usual approach of “debiasing law,” an 
important advantage of strategies for debiasing through law is that they aim 
to correct errors while still preserving some opportunity to make choices. 
Under Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff’s approach of debiasing 
through procedural rules in response to litigants’ self-serving bias, for 
instance, no decision making power or information is removed from litigants’ 
hands; by contrast, a “debiasing law” approach to litigants’ self-serving bias 
suggests keeping information out of their hands entirely (Issacharoff and 
                                                 
4 It is possible that “real” self-serving bias – outside of the lab – is more 
resilient (Farnsworth 2003:582-85). 
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Loewenstein 1995). An important corollary of this attribute of debiasing 
through law is that, unlike “debiasing law” strategies, the approach of 
debiasing through law will frequently make it possible for government to 
improve outcomes for individuals who exhibit bounded rationality while 
leaving unrestricted the choices of those who would not otherwise err. An 
emerging theme in the legal literature on bounded rationality is that it is 
preferable, when possible, to avoid imposing significant costs on those who 
do not exhibit boundedly rational behavior (Camerer, Issacharoff, 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003:1212; Mitchell 2002:132); below 
we describe specific strategies for debiasing through law that achieve this 
goal. In this sense, debiasing through law provides real advantages over 
“debiasing law” strategies.  
 
Still, at bottom, debiasing through law in either of its two varieties 
(substantive or procedural) involves the government in a self-conscious 
process of changing the behavior of at least some people by altering their 
perceptions of the reality around them. In some respects such government 
action is entirely routine, as government frequently and uncontroversially 
regulates in response to individuals’ misinformation; many strategies for 
debiasing through law are of just this character. But in some contexts 
debiasing through law could come to resemble a system of government 
propaganda in violation of widely-shared normative commitments; as our 
examples below will illustrate, however, many actual and conceivable forms 
of debiasing through law do not have this problem.  
 
 
1.   A General Description of Debiasing Through Law 
 
 
1.1  Preliminaries 
 
 If debiasing through law is a response to bounded rationality, then an 
obvious first step is to understand the basic idea of bounded rationality. As is 
now well known in the legal literature and beyond, researchers in psychology 
and behavioral economics have uncovered a wide range of departures from 
unboundedly rational behavior. These departures take one of two general 
forms. First, individuals may exhibit “judgment errors.” Second, human 
behavior may deviate from the precepts of expected utility theory. We briefly 
describe these two basic categories. 
 
1.1.1 Judgment Errors  
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 Judgment errors stem from “heuristics” and “biases” that often shape 
human decision making. Begin with a familiar example of a heuristic. Asked 
how many words in a 2,000-word section of a novel end in “ing,” people give 
much larger estimates than those asked how many words have “n” as the 
second-to-last letter in the same material, notwithstanding the obvious fact 
that more words must satisfy the latter criterion than the former (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1983:295). According to the “availability heuristic” at work in 
cases of this sort, the probability of an event is estimated after an assessment 
of how easily examples of the event can be called to mind. The availability 
heuristic often produces sensible judgments and behavior for people who lack 
detailed statistical information, but it can lead to significant and severe errors. 
The prospect of errors in some cases does not suggest that the behavior in 
question is “irrational” in the sense of being arbitrary or lacking plausible 
justification. The point instead is that the behavior, even if sensible in many 
cases, leads to systematic error in some of them. Bounded rationality is 
hardly the same as “irrationality.”5  
 
The use of heuristics has also been shown to lead people to 
misestimate probabilities by committing the “conjunction fallacy” 
(concluding that characteristics X and Y are more likely to be present than 
characteristic X alone) – errors produced by the so-called representativeness 
heuristic. For instance, after reading a paragraph about a thirty-one year old 
woman, Linda, who was concerned with issues of social justice and 
discrimination in college, most people erroneously tend to say that Linda is 
more likely to be “a bank teller and active in the feminist movement” than to 
be “a bank teller” (Tversky and Kahneman 1982:92-94). Heuristics, then, are 
not themselves biases, but they can produce biases. Thus “availability bias” 
might be said to arise when the availability heuristic leads people to make 
predictable errors in assessing probabilities. 
 
A related set of findings by psychologists and behavioral economists 
emphasizes not mental short-cuts, but more direct biases that lead to 
inaccurate judgments. An example is hindsight bias, in which decision 
makers attach excessively high probabilities to events that ended up 
occurring; we referred to this bias above in discussing corporate law’s 
business judgment rule. We also referred above to self-serving bias – in 
which individuals interpret information in directions that serve their own 
                                                 
5 For further discussion, see Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998:1594). 
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interests – in illustrating prospects for successful debiasing through 
procedural rules. 
 
Another bias that has received significant attention in the legal 
literature – and that we suggest in section 2 creates important opportunities 
for debiasing through substantive law – is optimism bias. Optimism bias 
refers to the tendency of people to believe that their own probability of facing 
a bad outcome is lower than it actually is. People typically think that their 
chances of having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease, or 
getting fired from a job are significantly lower than the average person’s 
chances of suffering these misfortunes – although of course this cannot be 
true for everyone. Estimates offered by individuals for their own probabilities 
range from twenty to eighty percent below the average person’s probability.6 
 
While this “above average” effect is well established, it does not by 
itself establish that people optimistically underestimate their statistical risk 
(Viscusi 2002:162-66). People could believe, for example, that they are less 
likely than most people to contract cancer, while also having an accurate 
sense of the probability that they will contract cancer. But substantial 
evidence suggests that people sometimes exhibit optimism bias in the 
estimation of actual probabilities, not simply relative risk. For example, 
professional financial experts consistently overestimate likely earnings, and 
business school students overestimate their likely starting salary and the 
number of offers that they will receive (Armour and Taylor 2002:334-35). 
People also underestimate their own likelihood of being involved in a serious 
automobile accident, and their frequent failure to buy insurance for floods 
and earthquakes is consistent with the view that people are excessively 
optimistic.7 It is also noteworthy that these data pointing to optimism bias 
come from individuals making judgments that they make regularly in their 
everyday lives, rather than judgments far removed from those they would 
ordinarily make.  
 
 
1.1.2 Departures from Expected Utility Theory 
 
Along with the category of judgment errors, the idea of bounded 
rationality includes ways in which actual choices depart from the predictions 
of expected utility theory – a foundational feature of standard rational-choice 
                                                 
6 See Jolls (1998:1659-62) for a discussion of the relevant studies. 
7 Jolls (1998:1660-61) describes the relevant studies. 
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analysis. While departures from expected utility theory have received only 
modest attention in the existing social science literature on debiasing of 
boundedly rational actors (for reasons we shall explain), below we suggest 
their relevance to debiasing through law. 
 
A leading alternative to expected utility theory is Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. According to this theory, people 
evaluate outcomes based on the change they represent from an initial 
reference point, rather than based on the nature of the outcome itself. For 
example, discovering that one will receive a bonus of $2500 is often 
experienced differently if the previous year’s bonus was $0 than if the 
previous year’s bonus was $5000, wholly apart from any tangible financial 
obligations the individual faces. Prospect theory also posits that people weigh 
losses more heavily than gains, thus showing “loss aversion.”  
 
Related to loss aversion is the “endowment effect,” according to 
which an individual’s valuation of an entitlement depends on whether the 
individual is given initial ownership of that entitlement (Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler 1990). Thus, for example, individuals endowed with university 
mugs demand substantially more to sell these mugs than unendowed 
individuals are willing to pay to buy them.  
 
 Also related to loss aversion are framing effects. Losses matter more 
than gains, and thus framing outcomes as losses rather than gains will greatly 
affect how people respond. Many studies support this idea8 – as does a 
widely-publicized dispute over the content of a government advertising 
campaign in the United States (Peterson 2003). The advertising campaign in 
question involved the effects of breastfeeding of newborns. In the approach 
favored by breastfeeding advocates, the advertisements would refer to the 
risks to the child of leukemia and other diseases from not consuming breast 
milk – whereas infant formula manufacturers favored an approach that 
stressed the benefits to the child from breastfeeding. Showing an intuitive 
understanding of prospect theory, the infant formula manufacturers fought to 
have the government emphasize the advantages of breastfeeding rather than 
the affirmative harms (losses) of not breastfeeding. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For a recent overview, see Mellers (2004). 
  
 
8
1.2 Debiasing Versus Incentives  
 
What does it mean, in general, to “debias” boundedly rational actors? 
The general question of what counts as “debiasing” of boundedly rational 
actors is important because there are many channels by which boundedly 
rational behavior may be made to “go away” or diminish in degree. Some but 
not all of these qualify as debiasing of boundedly rational actors under the 
general definition we develop here.   
 
Consider the following examples: 
 
 (1) People are prone to social influences, so much so that many 
people will ignore the clear evidence of their own senses, and hence provide 
incorrect answers, if they are confronted with the unanimous views of others 
(Asch 1955). This kind of “conformity bias,” in which the views of others are 
used as a kind of heuristic for the proper answer, is significantly reduced 
when financial incentives are provided. When people stand to gain 
economically from a correct answer and when they have confidence in their 
own judgment, they are far more likely to ignore the crowd, to say what they 
think, and to answer correctly (Baron 1996). 
 
 (2) Recall from the introduction that individuals in the role of litigants 
have a tendency to see cases in the light most favorable to their own side. But 
imagine that they are required to consider weaknesses in their side or reasons 
that the judge might rule against them. In that case, the “self-serving bias” 
bias they had previously exhibited vanishes (Babcock, Loewenstein and 
Issacharoff 1997). 
 
 (3) We have already mentioned thirty-one year old Linda, who was 
concerned with issues of social justice and discrimination in college. Recall 
from section 1.1.1 above that most people tend to say that Linda is more 
likely to be “a bank teller and active in the feminist movement” than to be “a 
bank teller.” This is a familiar example of the conjunction fallacy, produced 
by the representativeness heuristic. But as Gerd Gigerenzer has demonstrated, 
people are less likely to commit the conjunction fallacy when asked about 
frequencies rather than probabilities. If asked, “of 100 people who fit the 
description” of Linda, how many are bank tellers and how many are bank 
tellers and active in the feminist movement, the level of conjunction 
violations drops from 80 percent or more to 20 percent or less (Gigerenzer 
2000:250). 
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 The first of these examples is one in which boundedly rational 
behavior is eliminated by the provision of financial incentives. A broad 
definition of debiasing of boundedly rational actors might embrace this sort 
of technique, but we think it is preferable to exclude the underlying form of 
behavior here from the category of boundedly rational behavior (so that the 
removal of the behavior by the provision of incentives does not count as 
“debiasing” of boundedly rational actors in the sense that we use that term). 
For some purposes, it might be useful to understand incentives as a way of 
overcoming boundedly rational behavior by increasing the stakes. Baruch 
Fischhoff, for instance, describes “rais[ing] stakes” as a possible strategy for 
debiasing of boundedly rational actors (Fischhoff 1982:424; Fischhoff 
2003:732).  
 
But it seems most conservative, and most consistent with existing 
conventions in analyses of bounded rationality, to limit the category of 
boundedly rational behavior to that which survives even in the presence of 
financial or other consequences for exhibiting the behavior.9 If an apparent 
departure from unbounded rationality is eliminated with the provision of 
financial incentives, then many would conclude that it was not a departure 
from unbounded rationality at all, but instead a mere result of lazy or careless 
decision making by an actor who had no reason to be other than lazy or 
careless. Under our definition, therefore, the technique used in the first 
example above is not a strategy for debiasing of boundedly rational actors. 
And the same goes for techniques that eliminate boundedly rational behavior 
by improving a previously faulty aspect of an experimental design – although 
here again Fischhoff’s broad conception of debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors embraces such manipulations. 
 
 The second and third examples above are standard cases of debiasing 
of individuals exhibiting bounded rationality. Subjects are asked to consider 
arguments or information of a particular sort, and the consideration of such 
arguments or information reduces or eliminates the boundedly rational 
behavior they previously exhibited. It is important to emphasize how the 
technique here differs from incentives. Actors are not asked to repeat the very 
same task with the very same structure, with the sole difference that they now 
have greater reason to take care in making their choices (which in the legal 
domain would correspond to some, although not all, “debiasing law” 
                                                 
9 Camerer and Hogarth (1999) make this implicit claim, and offer a great deal 
of evidence that many cases of boundedly rational behavior are not 
eliminated by the provision of incentives. 
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strategies – for instance, those that increase punishments for certain types of 
behavior); instead the environment is restructured in a way that alters not 
actors’ motivation but the actual process by which they perceive the reality 
around them. Thus, we define debiasing of boundedly rational actors as using 
techniques that intervene in and alter the situation that produces the 
boundedly rational behavior, without operating on the degree of motivation 
or effort an actor brings to the task. Debiasing through law is then the use of 
legal rules to achieve such debiasing of boundedly rational actors. 
  
 
2. Debiasing Through Substantive Law 
 
This section fills out the general description offered in section 1 by 
developing a set of organizing examples of debiasing through substantive 
law. (The introduction and the appendix refer to existing examples of 
debiasing through procedural rules.) We show how the idea of debiasing 
through substantive law can or does address important choices the legal 
system must make across a range of legal domains. Our discussion follows 
the division in section 1.1 between bounded rationality in the form of 
judgment errors and bounded rationality in the form of departures from 
expected utility theory. 
 
The domain of our analysis in this section is forms of bounded 
rationality that the existing social science literature has shown to be 
responsive to strategies for debiasing of boundedly rational actors. This point 
is important because not all types of bounded rationality respond well to such 
strategies. Many manipulations fail to reduce hindsight bias, for instance; 
and, even worse, some seemingly sensible strategies for reducing this bias 
have actually increased it (Sanna, Schwarz and Stocker 2002). To be sure, 
studies that have required subjects to “rethink the inferences that they have 
made upon learning [an] outcome” and have then “demonstrated to them that 
other inferences remained plausible” have shown some success in reducing 
hindsight bias (Rachlinski 1998:586-88).10 However, in most cases strategies 
– even fairly aggressive ones – for debiasing boundedly rational actors have 
enjoyed limited, if any, success in combating hindsight bias (Fischhoff 
1982:427-31; Hastie and Viscusi 1998:917; Kamin and Rachlinski 1995:97-
98; Rachlinski 1999:824). But in other contexts, techniques for debiasing of 
boundedly rational actors have shown substantial promise. One example is 
                                                 
10 Stallard and Worthington (1998:680-81) is an example of successful 
debiasing of hindsight-biased behavior. 
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the case of self-serving bias; as noted, having subjects consider the 
weaknesses in their case or reasons that the judge might rule against them 
appears effective in eliminating self-serving bias in litigation – a form of 
debiasing through procedural rules (Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff 
1997). We focus below on cases in which debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors has shown a strong likelihood of success in the existing social science 
literature. 
 
 
2.1  Debiasing Through Substantive Law in Response to Judgment Errors 
 
 
2.1.1 Debiasing Through Consumer Safety Law 
 
A vast number of federal and state laws regulate the safety of 
products used by consumers.11 A major impetus for these laws is the belief 
that consumers often do not adequately understand the potential risks of such 
products. Consumers may not adequately understand such risks because they 
are imperfectly informed, because they suffer from bounded rationality – 
most familiarly because of the phenomenon of optimism bias described in 
section 1.1 above – or both.  
 
The traditional law and economics view of the consumer safety 
context is that the problem (if there is one at all) merely involves imperfect 
information, and thus is appropriately corrected by the straightforward 
provision of additional information (Stiglitz 1986:90-91). However, as the 
earlier discussion of optimism bias suggested and as Jon Hanson and Douglas 
Kysar (1999a:1511-12; 1999b:729-30), among others, have emphasized, 
optimism bias will lead many consumers to underestimate their personal risks 
even if they receive accurate information about average risks. To be sure, 
optimism bias is context-dependent (Armour and Taylor 2002:338-41). But 
the factors that tend to reduce the extent of the bias – deliberation, close 
temporal proximity between the decision and the outcome of the decision, 
                                                 
11 See, for example, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000)  (Toxic Substances 
Control Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000) (Consumer Product Safety 
Act); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (state tort law). 
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and severe consequences of error – are likely to be absent in the consumer 
safety context, with the possible exception of the severity of consequences.12 
 
   It would not be unreasonable to conclude that optimism bias justifies 
heightened standards of products liability as an alternative to the provision of 
additional statistical facts about the product in question. Hanson and Kysar 
(1999a:1560), for instance, argue in favor of enterprise liability on the basis 
of (among other factors) optimism bias. However, such an approach – 
seeking to “debias law” by insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly 
rational behavior – imposes large costs of its own (Priest 1987). A still more 
aggressive “debiasing law” approach, available under existing law in the case 
of some products, is an across-the-board ban on the product’s use. A number 
of federal statutes give agencies a choice among disclosure requirements and 
partial or complete bans.13 In response to evidence of inadequate information, 
optimism bias, and other consumer errors, some regulators might well be 
tempted to impose a ban even if the statute reflects a preference for 
disclosure.14 
 
An alternative to these “debiasing law” strategies is to use the law to 
reduce the occurrence of boundedly rational behavior in the first instance. At 
the broadest level, strategies for debiasing through consumer safety law 
provide a sort of middle ground between inaction or the economists’ spare 
prescription of “more information,” on the one hand, and the aggressive 
“debiasing law” strategies of heightened products liability standards or 
outright bans, on the other. Strategies for debiasing through consumer safety 
law may be far more successful than the mere provision of statistical facts, 
and also far more protective of consumer prerogatives than the strategy of an 
across-the-board ban. Our analysis shares a starting point with traditional 
proposals for better “informing” consumers, but comes to a quite different 
end point given our empirically-based appreciation of the limits of some 
forms of information provision, such as those that simply offer general 
statistical facts.  
 
                                                 
12 Hanson and Kysar (1999a:1511-12) provide further discussion of the role 
of contextual factors in determining optimism bias in the consumer safety 
context. 
13 See sources cited in note 11 above. 
14 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(interpreting Toxic Substances Control Act to require the least restrictive 
regulatory alternative). 
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In our discussion below of debiasing through consumer safety law, we 
will focus on scenarios in which optimism bias is likely to produce an overall 
underestimation by consumers of the risk associated with a given product. In 
some circumstances, a competing form of bounded rationality could lead 
consumers to overestimate rather than underestimate the risk associated with 
a product. For instance, highly available instances of accident or injury can 
lead to excessive pessimism – a distortion opposite to the one produced by 
optimism bias (Schwartz and Wilde 1983:1437). Alternatively, likelihoods of 
very low probability events may be overestimated, although the empirical 
evidence here is mixed, with some studies suggesting overestimation of the 
likelihood of very low probability events (Viscusi 1988:287-88) and other 
studies suggesting underestimation of the likelihood of such events 
(Kunreuther 1976:231-39). A general countervailing factor in the consumer 
product context – suggesting overall underestimation of risk in many cases – 
is that market pressures will tend to lead manufacturers of such products to 
present their products in ways that minimize consumers’ perceptions of risk 
(Hanson and Kysar 1999a:1425-26). Our focus in this section is on cases in 
which optimism bias leads to underestimation of the risks associated with a 
given product.  
 
 
2.1.1.1  Evidence on Debiasing in Response to Optimism Bias 
 
Straightforward potential strategies in the social science literature for 
debiasing in response to optimism bias include suggesting reasons that 
negative outcomes might occur and considering risk factors related to 
negative outcomes. However, such approaches usually fail to reduce 
optimism bias (Weinstein and Klein 2002:322-23). The social science 
evidence thus suggests that successful strategies for debiasing in response to 
optimism bias will typically require harnessing separate aspects of boundedly 
rational behavior. Consider two distinct possibilities. 
 
Debiasing through the availability heuristic.  One potential response 
to the risk that optimistically biased individuals believe “it won’t happen to 
them” is the availability heuristic described in section 1.1.1 above. Recall our 
earlier example of this heuristic: individuals asked how many words in a 
2,000-word section of a novel end in “ing” give much larger estimates than 
individuals asked how many words have “n” as the second-to-last letter 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983:295). Use of the availability heuristic often 
produces a form of judgment error; as with optimism bias, availability can 
lead to systematic mistakes in the assessment of probabilities. (Thus 
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“availability bias,” in the form of excessively high estimates, and 
“unavailability bias,” in the form of excessively low estimates, involve 
complementary errors stemming from the use of this heuristic.) But because 
making an occurrence “available” increases individuals’ estimates of the 
likelihood of the occurrence (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman and Reynolds 
2002), availability has been found to be a promising strategy for debiasing of 
boundedly rational actors suffering from excessive optimism.   
 
 In fact a recent series of studies of smoking behavior finds a 
phenomenon of this kind. A notable theme of the book-length treatment by 
Sloan, Taylor and Smith (2003) is that smokers are more likely to believe that 
smoking will harm their health if they are aware of specific instances of such 
harm.  
 
As an example of the basic idea of debiasing through the availability 
heuristic, consider the finding of Neil Weinstein (1980:810) that many people 
substantially underestimate their risk of cancer. Imagine that women asked to 
estimate their risk of breast cancer are told, before giving their estimates, a 
poignant and detailed story about a woman their age with similar family and 
other circumstances who was diagnosed with breast cancer. If so, then the 
empirical results noted above (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman and 
Reynolds 2002) suggest that their estimated probabilities will typically be 
higher. (Of course, they may be too much higher or not enough higher – 
points we discuss at some length in our normative analysis in section 3 
below).  
 
Debiasing through framing. A second possible mechanism for 
debiasing in response to optimism bias involves framing effects of the sort 
discussed in section 1.1.2 above. As we noted, the social science evidence 
shows that many people weigh losses more heavily than gains in evaluating 
potential outcomes. This evidence suggests that framing the presentation of 
information to exploit the extra weight attached to losses may counteract 
bounded rationality in the form of optimism bias. 
 
Consider one well-known illustration of the effects of framing. In a 
study involving breast cancer risk and breast self-examination, material that 
describes the positive effects of self-examination – such as a higher chance of 
discovering a tumor at an earlier stage – is ineffective. By contrast, 
significant behavioral changes result from material that stresses the negative 
consequences of failing to undertake self-examination – such as a decreased 
chance of discovering a tumor when it remains treatable (Meyerowitz and 
  
 
15
Chaiken 1987:505). Thus, if women are optimistically biased about the 
prospects that they will suffer from breast cancer and hence underestimate the 
value of engaging in recommended self-examinations, then framing the 
recommendation to self-examine in terms of losses rather than gains should 
increase the probability they attach to benefiting from a self-examination. 
 
 
2.1.1.2  Legal Implications 
 
We now apply these forms of debiasing in response to optimism bias 
to the context of consumer safety law. We consider debiasing through the 
availability heuristic and debiasing through framing in turn. 
 
 Debiasing through the availability heuristic. In the consumer safety 
context, debiasing through the availability heuristic would focus on putting at 
consumers’ cognitive disposal the prospect of negative outcomes from use, or 
at least unsafe use, of a particular product. Specifically, the law could impose 
a set of requirements on the way that information about the product would be 
presented to consumers. Firms might be required – on pain of administrative 
penalties or tort liability – to provide a truthful account of consequences that 
resulted from a particular harm-producing use of the product, rather than 
simply providing a generalized warning that fails to harness availability. To 
enhance the efficacy of this proposed strategy, the law could further require 
that the real-life story of accident or injury be printed in large type and 
displayed prominently, so that consumers would be likely to see and read it 
before using the product. Mandatory warnings could conceivably raise first 
amendment issues, but so long as there is no political or ideological 
disagreement with the content of the message such warnings are likely to be 
constitutional.15  
 
The evidence suggests that the approach of requiring the specific 
account as opposed to the generalized warning would help to reduce 
optimism bias (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman and Reynolds 2002). Our 
point here is similar in spirit to Chris Guthrie’s suggestion that legal policy 
makers bring “vivid information about plaintiff losses in frivolous litigation” 
to bear in reducing plaintiffs’ overestimation of the probability of success in 
                                                 
15 Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, 512 U.S. 1145 (1997). The 
Supreme Court will consider a related set of issues this Term in Veneman v. 
Livestock Marketing Ass’n, cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 2389 (mem.) (No. 03-
1164). 
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such litigation – an illustration of debiasing through procedural rules (Guthrie 
2000:210). More generally, the guiding idea is that the way information is 
provided may be just as important as (or more important than) that 
information is provided. 
 
 It bears noting that an effort to use availability to counteract optimism 
bias would improve not only the decision making of consumers suffering 
from optimism bias but also that of consumers suffering from simple 
information failures. A conspicuous, prominent account of injury from a 
product may help to correct the estimated probability of harm attached to the 
product by an optimistically biased consumer. At the same time, it should 
improve the behavior of imperfectly informed but not necessarily biased 
consumers. 
 
 Our earlier mention of the prospects for manufacturers’ influence over 
how consumers perceive their products (Hanson and Kysar 1999a:1425-26) 
suggests the importance of legal control over the nature of the accounts 
manufacturers are required to provide. It is possible – and commentators such 
as Hanson and Kysar might well fear – that manufacturers, influenced by 
market pressures, would manage to subvert attempts to achieve debiasing 
through consumer safety law. Ultimately the question is an empirical one, but 
in our view the costs that Priest and others have noted of “debiasing law” 
alternatives suggest the value of investigating the efficacy of alternative 
strategies involving debiasing through law. 
 
 The effort to achieve debiasing through law in the way described here 
should be modest along two separate dimensions. First, a successful strategy 
would need to target a limited number of discrete products for which the 
problem of consumer optimism bias was most important. Consumers would 
begin to suffer from “information overload” if every time they went to buy 
any product – from a lawnmower to a candy bar to a fast food hamburger – 
they were hit with a real-life story of an individual harmed by use or 
consumption of the product. Their natural response might be to tune out all of 
the accounts provided by firms, even assuming these accounts were 
prominently displayed (Viscusi 1996:665-66).16  
 
                                                 
16 Elsewhere Professor Viscusi discusses ways of implementing multi-tiered 
systems, where high-risk products contain warnings on their labels while 
stores offer binders with risk information for low-risk products. 
  
 
17
Second, the law would need to avoid overreaching in the severity of 
the featured outcomes. Firms should not be required to provide anecdotes 
reflecting highly unusual consequences of using their products; only if an 
outcome occurs with some frequency should the law seek to induce firms to 
make consumers aware of the prospect. An emphasis on worst-case scenarios 
might produce excessive responses (Sunstein 2002). If requirements of 
anecdote-based warnings sweep in extremely unusual or unlikely scenarios, 
consumers might overreact – or alternatively they might lose faith and fail to 
attach any weight at all to the accounts. Of course there are line-drawing 
problems here, but the basic point is straightforward.  
 
Note in addition that worst-case scenarios are likely to be much more 
easily avoided with our suggestion of a legal requirement that firms provide 
truthful anecdotes about genuine harms than with the alternative strategy – 
frequently used by government – of public information campaigns 
concerning risky consumer products. Such campaigns have often resulted in 
the use of extremely vivid and salient images, to the point of seriously risking 
overreaction or even backlash as a result of citizens’ perceptions of 
government “manipulation.” In the smoking context, for instance, the 
European Union has experimented with requirements that a percentage of 
cigarette packages sold have their fronts covered with vivid pictures of 
rotting teeth and blackened lungs.17 We think the approach suggested here is 
sounder because it is more restrained. Similar to the European Union, the 
Canadian Health Ministry has required not only clear warnings (“Cigarettes 
cause strokes,” “Tobacco smoke hurts babies,” “Don't poison us,” and 
“Tobacco can make you impotent”) but also graphic pictures such as bleeding 
gums and two lungs with cancerous tumors.18 Likewise, in the United States 
a well-known anti-drug advertisement from the 1980s featured a picture of an 
egg frying in a pan with the voiceover, “This is your brain on drugs” (Dawan 
2004). Again, we think it is often valuable to avoid such extreme messages. 
 
In sum, our suggestion of requiring, on pain of administrative 
sanctions or tort liability, truthful narratives of harm is a more modest and 
measured response to optimism bias than the approaches just described – 
approaches that harness availability by aggressively exploiting highly salient, 
                                                 
17 See http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/intl-tobacco/2001q1/000426.html 
(visited 9/3/04). 
18 See http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/health/2000/12/ 
item20001224133940_1.htm (visited 9/3/04). 
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gripping images and that for this very reason may run an especially high risk 
of manipulation, overshooting, and other problems.  
 
 The idea of requiring firms to provide truthful accounts of harm has 
analogies in current practice. The American Legacy Foundation, a non-profit 
organization founded out of the 1998 settlement agreements between the 
United States tobacco industry and state attorneys general, has launched an 
information campaign employing a close parallel to the strategy outlined here 
of debiasing through the availability heuristic. The Foundation has publicized 
parting letters to children and other loved ones from mothers dying of 
smoking-related diseases; for instance, one letter reads, “Dearest Jon, I am so 
sorry my smoking will cheat us out of 20 or 30 more years together. 
Remember the fun we had every year at the lake. I will ALWAYS love and 
treasure you. Linda.”19 Our suggested approach reflects much the same 
spirit.20 
 
Debiasing through framing. Framing effects also point toward 
potentially effective methods of debiasing through substantive law in the 
consumer safety context. Simple requirements that firms “provide 
information” may be ineffective in this context in part because firms’ interest 
will be in framing the information in a way that minimizes the risks perceived 
by consumers. (Recall the shrewd infant formula manufacturers, described in 
section 1.1.2, who showed an intuitive appreciation of loss aversion.) By 
contrast, a legal requirement that firms identify the negative consequences 
associated with their product or a particular use of their product, rather than 
the positive consequences associated with an alternative product or with an 
alternative use of their product, may be an effective means of reducing 
optimism bias exhibited by consumers. Such a step could make significant 
progress toward ensuring that consumers have a more accurate understanding 
of the risks associated with particular products, and could reduce the need for 
either a complete ban on some of the products in question or other “debiasing 
law” solutions. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See http://women.americanlegacy.org/index.cfm (visited 9/3/04). 
20 It is possible that, as Douglas Kysar (2003:1786 n364) has noted, 
“debiasing law” strategies such as enterprise liability would give some firms 
indirect incentives to provide the sorts of truthful accounts we suggest here.  
Our emphasis, however, is on more direct strategies for debiasing through 
substantive law. 
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2.1.2 Debiasing Through Corporate Law 
 
A basic question in corporate law concerns the optimal breakdown of 
board composition between so-called “inside” and “outside” directors.21 
Inside directors are those who are primarily employed by or otherwise closely 
connected with the corporation; outside directors, by contrast, have no such 
close links to the firm.  
 
A number of arguments support the inclusion of at least some outside 
directors on the board (Gilson and Kraakman 1991:873; Pozen 1994:140). Of 
particular relevance for our purposes is Donald Langevoort’s (2001:803, 809) 
suggestion that the involvement of such directors may help to overcome 
optimistically biased judgments (“organizational optimism”) on the part of 
inside directors – although Langevoort himself does not ultimately join those 
pressing for increases in outside directors. A “debiasing law” solution to the 
problem of board decisions impaired by optimistically biased inside directors 
would be to remove these decisions from the hands of the biased decision 
makers. By contrast, an approach of debiasing through substantive law would 
take the shape of increasing the number of outside directors on the board. 
Might legal rules mandating some threshold number of outside directors on 
the board constitute an effective form of debiasing through substantive law?  
 
  
2.1.2.1  Evidence on Debiasing in Response to Optimism Bias (Again) 
 
If outside directors on corporate boards would help to overcome 
optimistically biased judgments on the part of inside directors, two things 
would have to be true. First, outside directors would have to be less subject to 
optimism bias than inside directors. Second, the involvement of outside 
directors would have to alter the ultimate group judgment reached by the 
board members. What do we know about each of these empirical 
propositions? 
 
 The degree of optimism bias exhibited by inside versus outside 
directors has not been rigorously explored, but the corporate law literature 
suggests two tentative reasons for believing that outside directors will show a 
lesser degree of such bias (Langevoort 2001:803, 809). The first is that the 
selection of outside directors is less likely to be heavily influenced by 
whether candidates have highly optimistic views of the firms’ prospects (in 
                                                 
21 For a recent summary of the debate, see Langevoort (2001:797-99). 
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contrast to the case of top executives’ selection). The second reason is that 
outside directors’ self-conception and esteem are less closely bundled up with 
the firm’s fortunes. 
 
But will some minimum number of outsider directors improve the 
collective judgment reached by board members? A large body of empirical 
evidence shows that the probability of erroneous decisions often increases 
when deliberations are undertaken by like-minded people; those who agree 
with one another typically end up at a more extreme point in line with their 
predeliberation tendencies (Sunstein 2003). In the context of corporate 
boards, the prediction is that optimistic members will lead one another in the 
direction of further optimism and excessive risk-taking. As a result, boards 
might well end up more optimistic than the median board member before 
deliberation began. Thus, the mandated inclusion of outside directors might 
well serve to check deliberative processes that fuel unrealistically optimistic 
decisions.22 
 
 
2.1.2.2  Legal Implications 
 
 A requirement of the recently-enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that 
boards use outside directors to perform all auditing functions – so that a 
threshold number of outside directors must be named to the board.23 The 
requirement of independent directors – reflected as well in various exchange-
listing rules (Sale 2004) – can be understood as a form of debiasing through 
substantive law because the presence of the outside directors responds to the 
risk of optimism bias on the part of boards stacked with inside directors.  
 
 Corporate law rules governing the structure of the legal-
organizational form of the board of directors may be a reasonable way to 
reduce the degree of optimism bias exhibited by inside directors on boards. 
Of course, it is possible that market pressures will impose meaningful 
constraints on optimism bias from inside directors or the boards they 
                                                 
22 Because, as discussed at the beginning of section 1.2, a solitary actor may 
find it hard to resist pressure from the remainder of the group, it might be 
important to ensure the presence of more than one outside director on the 
board. 
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301. 
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populate.24 But at the same time, other forces may increase the degree of 
optimism bias such actors exhibit; these include the process by which 
managerial executives are selected and the link between these individuals’ 
optimistic judgments and their self-conception and esteem (Langevoort 
1997:140; Langevoort 2001:809). Of course, wholly apart from the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, many boards do contain some outside 
directors, and this may represent a self-conscious effort by firms interested in 
(among other things) combating the problem of optimism bias on the part of 
inside directors. A legal requirement such as Sarbanes-Oxley, however, is 
likely to facilitate such debiasing on a broader scale, although at a cost of 
requiring outside directors on all covered boards notwithstanding substantial 
firm- and industry- specific variation in ideal board structure.25 We return to 
this last point in section 3 below. 
 
 
2.2 Debiasing Through Substantive Law in Response to Departures from 
Expected Utility Theory 
 
Social scientists have paid little attention to debiasing in response to 
departures from expected utility theory (in contrast to debiasing in response 
to judgment errors). The reason may be that such departures are not 
unambiguous “errors,” and thus it is controversial to say (for example) that 
the endowment effect, or loss aversion, is a kind of mistake that requires 
correction. Perhaps for the same reason, “debiasing law” strategies – familiar 
in the contexts discussed in section 2.1 above – are not prominent where 
departures from expected utility theory are in play.  
 
Our emphasis in this section is on the endowment effect, which says 
that individuals’ willingness to accept – the amount at which they would sell 
an entitlement – differs from their willingness to pay – the amount they 
would pay to purchase the entitlement. As suggested just above, in many 
settings the endowment effect is not an “error” in the sense of the judgment 
errors discussed in section 2.1, where individuals are making objective 
mistakes in estimating probabilities; instead it may be a reflection of 
potentially valid reasons for the difference between the two measures of 
value. In other contexts, however, a decision maker may determine that either 
willingness to accept or willingness to pay is the “correct” measure of value. 
                                                 
24 Tor (2002) provides analysis of the effects and limits of market pressures 
as a constraining force in the context of firm entry into new industry. 
25 On the importance of such variation, see Langevoort (2001:815). 
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Such settings are our focus in this section; we consider the role of debiasing 
through law in moving toward the chosen measure of value. 
 
 
2.2.1 Debiasing Through the Structure of Property Rights 
 
 A fundamental question of property law is whether legal entitlements 
should be protected by “property rules” or “liability rules” (Calabresi and 
Melamed 1972; Kaplow and Shavell 1996). Under a property rule, 
entitlement holders are not required to part with their entitlements unless they 
voluntarily agree (typically in a bargained-for exchange) to do so. Under a 
liability rule, by contrast, entitlement holders may be forced to give up their 
entitlements as long as they are paid an agreed-upon amount in damages. In 
the analysis just below we assume that a decision maker has determined that 
lowering willingness to accept to the level of willingness to pay (in cases 
which they differ) is desirable; we then ask how the choice between property 
and liability rules might play a role in achieving this effect. 
 
 
2.2.1.1  Evidence on Lowering Willingness to Accept to the Level of  
 Willingness to Pay 
 
A preliminary empirical study by Jeffrey Rachlinski and Forest 
Jourden (1998) points to a possible relationship between the divergence 
between willingness to accept and willingness to pay and the way in which 
the entitlement being valued is protected from violation. Rachlinski and 
Jordan’s study finds a marked reduction in the endowment effect, and hence 
the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay, when 
liability rules rather than property rules protect the entitlement in question. In 
the standard endowment effect pattern, willingness to accept is well above 
willingness to pay when the entitlement is protected by a property rule. But 
Rachlinski and Jourden find that when it is protected by a liability rule, 
willingness to accept falls to the level of willingness to pay. The authors offer 
an explanation of their results by suggesting that “a right that is protected by 
a damages remedy might convey less of a sense of ownership than does a 
right that is protected by an injunctive remedy” (p.1560). Such incomplete 
ownership may prevent a perfection of the emotional attachment that is 
harbinger of the endowment effect. 
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2.2.1.2  Legal Implications 
 
As Ian Ayres (1998:811-12) has suggested, Rachlinski and Jordan’s 
empirical findings imply that in domains in which the lower measure of value 
– willingness to pay – is determined by a decision maker to be the “correct” 
measure, liability rules may be preferable to property rules (although a 
complete analysis of the choice between property and liability rules involves 
many additional considerations26). Choosing liability rules over property 
rules may thus be regarded as a form of debiasing through substantive law, 
given our assumption above that the excess of willingness to accept over 
willingness to pay in the context in question is a form of “error” in need of 
correction. Liability rules, under Rachlinski and Jourden’s findings, eliminate 
the endowment effect by moving individuals’ willingness to accept down to 
the level of their willingness to pay. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the device of choosing liability rules 
over property rules would generally have this effect. People are often 
unaware of how, exactly, their entitlements are protected; if the legal system 
uses liability rules rather than property rules, many people will not be aware 
of it. Note also that in Rachlinski and Jourden’s study, the entitlements 
involved environmental amenities. In that distinctive context, the occurrence 
of the endowment effect under a property rule may have been “motivated by 
subjects’ belief that it is improper to sell an environmental resource that one 
can protect,” while this belief was not triggered under a liability rule 
“because the law permitted the destruction of the resource for a price” 
(Korobkin 2003:1285). Absent the societal commitment to environmental 
amenities, for which people often demand a great deal and on occasion refuse 
to sell at any price at all (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler:1327), it remains 
possible that the choice between property and liability rules would not have 
the same impact on willingness to accept versus willingness to pay. Further 
empirical work could help to shed light on this question.27  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Kaplow and Shavell (1996) provide a general analysis. 
27 Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001:250-57) argues, but without presenting any direct 
empirical evidence, that property rules may be preferable to liability rules for 
reducing the endowment effect in some contexts. 
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2.2.2 Debiasing Through Agency Law 
 
 In the context of merchants, as opposed to individuals acting in their 
private capacities, a strong endowment effect seems clearly undesirable, 
simply because it will make merchants reluctant to sell their goods – the very 
service they are performing for society. Might debiasing of boundedly 
rational actors – accepting as an assumption that the excess of willingness to 
accept over willingness to pay in this context is an “error” calling for 
correction – be possible in this domain, and if so is there a potential role for 
law to play? 
 
 
2.2.2.1  Evidence on Lowering Willingness to Accept to the Level of  
 Willingness to Pay (Again) 
 
An important empirical paper by Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and 
Eric Talley (2002) shows how debiasing of boundedly rational actors 
exhibiting the endowment effect – again assuming such an effect is an “error” 
calling for correction – can occur in sales transactions. Arlen, Spitzer and 
Talley find that actors exhibit the endowment effect when they are acting in 
their ordinary individual capacities, but not when they are acting in the role 
of corporate managers in a business agency context. Individuals who are 
instructed that they are acting as agents for the corporation that employs them 
“manifest[] virtually no endowment effect whatsoever” (p. 5). 
 
 What explains these findings? The two most likely explanations 
involve the business context and the manager’s agency relationship with the 
firm. Someone working in business – even if acting not as the agent of a 
corporation but as a sole proprietor of the business – will probably exhibit 
less of an endowment effect than someone acting in an ordinary individual 
capacity. One might think, for instance, that transactions conducted by a shoe 
store – whether or not the store is run by a manager – would not exhibit a 
large endowment effect. As suggested above, such a store would be unlikely 
to stay in business long if a strong endowment effect led it – whether acting 
through a manager or a proprietor – to price shoes at an amount well above 
people’s willingness to pay.   
 
It seems likely, however, that the agency relationship further dampens 
the tendency toward exhibiting an endowment effect. This is so because the 
endowment effect is often linked to a desire by entitlement holders to avoid 
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regretting a bad decision to engage in a transaction (sale of the entitlement).28 
But agents are less likely than ordinary individuals to experience regret 
because their personal stake in the outcomes that occur is lower (Korobkin 
2003:1255). Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the agency relationship 
itself helps to account for the finding of an absence of the endowment effect 
in a business agency relationship – although of course a definitive empirical 
study separately testing the two explanations could help put the conclusion on 
firmer ground. 
 
 
2.2.2.2  Legal Implications 
 
 An implication of this analysis is that existing rules of agency law, in 
structuring the relationship between corporations and their managers, may 
achieve a form of debiasing through substantive law for managerial actors 
(assuming, again, that the context in question is one in which the excess of 
willingness to accept over willingness to pay is an “error” calling for 
correction). Acting in the context of the relationship specified by the default 
rules of agency law, individuals may not display the endowment effect that 
has proven robust in other settings.  
 
 Of course, in theory the obligations associated with a business agency 
relationship could be specified by privately negotiated arrangements rather 
than by the default rules of agency law. Such arrangements, without the 
assistance of agency law, could ensure that much of business is done by 
agents acting on behalf of firms under a specified set of duties. But, as Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel (1982:702) have suggested in the related 
context of “standard form” fiduciary duties, such arrangements would usually 
be inferior to what emerges from a well-functioning system of law. The 
complexity and nuance of the requirements to be imposed point to the 
important value of legal rules. Easterbrook and Fischel’s specific focus is the 
standard form set of fiduciary duties provided by corporate law, but their 
claim that such standard forms allow for the “elastic contours” that a business 
relationship requires – and that make ex ante privately negotiated 
arrangements so difficult – is readily applicable here.   
 
A related point is that the provision by agency law of a default set of 
legal rules has the important effect – by comparison with a default rule 
                                                 
28 For recent discussions, see Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003:1224-25); Korobkin (2003:1254-55). 
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specifying no duties of agents to their firms, so that everything would be left 
to privately negotiated arrangements – of economizing on the substantial 
transaction costs that would arise with such negotiated arrangements. These 
costs might induce parties not to adopt agency relationships that (among 
other desirable consequences) reduce endowment effects in contexts in which 
those effects are “errors” calling for correction. Our suggestion here is simply 
that the basic rules of agency law provide an illustration of how existing rules 
may help to promote debiasing through substantive law in response to such 
“errors”.  
 
 
3.  Normative Issues In Debiasing Through Law 
 
In many settings, debiasing through law provides a more direct and 
effective response to problems of bounded rationality than the more typical 
approach of “debiasing law,” which seeks to insulate legal outcomes from 
boundedly rational behavior that itself is taken as a given. Below we develop 
and defend this central claim about the normative appeal of debiasing through 
law. We also address possible normative objections to debiasing through law. 
 
 
3.1  The Problem of the Second Best 
 
A threshold point that is common to normative analysis of both 
“debiasing law” and “debiasing through law” strategies is that, wholly apart 
from any legal intervention, a given form of boundedly rational behavior may 
always be offset by another aspect of bounded rationality that tends in the 
opposite direction. Simply put, some departures from unbounded rationality 
can counteract others. In such cases efforts either to insulate legal outcomes 
from the effects of a given form of bounded rationality (“debiasing law”) or 
to engage in debiasing through law in response to this form of bounded 
rationality might actually make things worse rather than better – a clear 
application of the general theory of the second best (Besharov 2004).  
 
Whether a given aspect of bounded rationality is in fact likely to be in 
an offsetting relationship with some other feature of bounded rationality will 
obviously depend on the particular context.29 In our applications in section 2, 
                                                 
29 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998:1524), for instance, discuss the partially 
offsetting relationship between hindsight bias and optimism bias in the tort 
law context. 
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we focused on situations in which there was no readily apparent counterforce 
to the aspect of bounded rationality that argued for debiasing through law. 
Obviously, if an offsetting relationship with another feature of bounded 
rationality exists, a legal response – whether “debiasing law” or debiasing 
through law – may well be unwarranted. 
 
 
3.2 Correcting Factual Errors  
 
Section 2 above distinguished between debiasing through law in 
response to judgment errors (section 2.1) and debiasing through law in 
response to departures from expected utility theory (section 2.2). In the latter 
context, the government intervention cannot be said simply to operate by 
correcting factual errors; and thus in section 2.2’s analysis we assumed rather 
than argued that, in certain contexts, eliminating the endowment effect was a 
suitable target of debiasing through law. By contrast, when, as in section 2.1, 
debiasing through law is a response to a judgment error, the normative 
impetus for the government intervention is more straightforward. 
 
Debiasing through law in response to judgment errors – for instance, a 
consumer’s underestimation of the probability that an accident will occur – is 
indistinguishable from a vast array of existing government initiatives. In 
countless domains, the government either discloses information on its own or 
requires disclosure by those providing goods or services in response to 
erroneous factual perceptions people would otherwise hold (Viscusi and 
Magat 1987; Karkainen 2001). When people are committing a clear factual 
error, there is broad agreement that government may legitimately concern 
itself with correcting the error. It seems hard to think of a plausible objection 
to this ground for government intervention. 
 
While the government’s ends in our analysis are thus uncomplicated 
(either because the ends involve correction of factual errors or because, as in 
section 2.2, we have simply assumed that eliminating the endowment effect is 
a suitable target of government action), the means employed in debiasing 
through law require further discussion. In the examples of debiasing through 
consumer safety law and through the law of corporate boards, for instance, 
the government action in question involves harnessing separate departures 
from unbounded rationality to correct errors. This additional complexity 
raises important and distinctive issues, to which we now turn. 
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3.3 Heterogeneous Actors 
 
As recent literature has appropriately emphasized, not all individuals 
are likely to be boundedly rational, at least not to the same degree (Mitchell 
2002:83-119). In such circumstances, a strategy of debiasing through law 
could introduce new distortions through its effect on those who did not 
previously exhibit bounded rationality. Consider, for instance, the strategic 
employment of the availability heuristic in response to optimism bias, 
discussed in section 2.1.1 above. In this case, the legal intervention might 
distort the behavior of individuals who did not suffer from optimism bias in 
the first place. For those who previously had an accurate understanding of the 
situation, such strategies for debiasing through law could produce a kind of 
unrealistic pessimism. In such cases, it is no longer possible to say that, even 
if the legal intervention does not provide much help, it is unlikely to cause 
much harm. (Note the contrast with traditional strategies of providing 
information to those who previously lacked it; such strategies should not 
significantly affect those who already possessed the information.) A similar 
problem arises with respect to debiasing through corporate law in the form of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. If, among the set of heterogeneous corporate boards, 
some do not exhibit optimistically biased decision making, then the legally-
mandated presence of outsiders on the board could introduce distortions for 
boards whose behavior was previously undistorted. So too, the strategies 
described in section 2.2 for debiasing through law in response to the 
endowment effect conceivably could distort measures of value for those who 
did not initially exhibit an endowment effect. 
 
In some (perhaps many) cases, actors who do not suffer from a 
particular form of bounded rationality, such as optimism bias, will also be 
free of other forms of bounded rationality, such as reliance on the availability 
heuristic. If those who are immune from optimism bias also tend to be 
immune from availability bias, then the strategies described above for 
debiasing through the availability heuristic should not affect those who did 
not previously suffer from optimism bias. In such cases, strategies for 
debiasing through law – like traditional informational strategies (Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003:1232-35) – should 
not affect those who did not err prior to the legal intervention.      
 
When the absence of one form of bounded rationality correlates in 
this way with the absence of others, strategies for debiasing through law fit 
with a broader emerging theme in the legal literature on bounded rationality: 
Adopt approaches that will correct errors, but without imposing significant 
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costs on those who are unlikely to err. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, 
George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin (2003:1212), for 
instance, have argued on behalf of “asymmetrical paternalism,” that is, a 
strategy that counteracts forms of bounded rationality that reduce welfare, but 
that does not significantly affect people who did not previously exhibit 
boundedly rational behavior. Strategies of this kind are desirable because 
some people, intuitively or reflectively alert to the risk of such behavior, can 
be expected to take responsive action on their own (Rachlinski 2003:1211-
19).  
 
To the extent that debiasing through law has no significant effects on 
those whose behavior did not initially exhibit bounded rationality, the 
approach greatly contrasts with the alternative approach of “debiasing law.” 
Suppose, for instance, that one responds to optimism bias on the part of 
consumers not by trying to reduce biased judgments but by insulating legal 
outcomes from the effects of such judgments through a mandatory rule 
expanding manufacturer liability for consumer products. If so, then one will 
have altered some legal outcomes that were not in any need of reform at all. 
The potential contrast with strategies for debiasing through law is clear.30 
 
In all of our examples of debiasing through law, the government 
intervention is unlikely to be entirely cost-free for those who did not 
previously show bounded rationality. But any provision of information by 
government – often a wholly uncontroversial strategy – will impose costs on 
those who did not err prior to the intervention simply because of the burden 
of processing the information. If the intervention produces important benefits 
for those who are prone to bounded rationality, then the intervention may be 
desirable even if it imposes modest costs on others. Here, as in other 
contexts, the only option is to weigh the effects of the different possible 
strategies. Of course efforts to debias people through law should be 
undertaken, whenever possible, in ways that do not produce confusion or 
misperception, as we discuss more fully in the next subsection. 
 
 
3.4  Overshooting and Autonomy 
 
                                                 
30 As Jeffrey Rachlinski (2003:1224) has written (in the course of discussing 
forms of debiasing different from the approach emphasized in this paper), 
“[G]overnments can adopt measures that restructure decisions as a less 
intrusive alternative to paternalistic restrictions on choice.”  
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Strategies for debiasing through law that harness other departures 
from bounded rationality raise two additional concerns that require separate 
analysis. The first is the risk of overshooting. If truthful narratives are used in 
the context of consumer safety law, individuals who previously showed 
optimism bias might be led to exaggerate the risks of consumer products. The 
effort to debias through law would then be producing biases and errors of its 
own. 
 
Experimentation would be required to calibrate the degree to which 
availability or another form of bounded rationality would need to be brought 
to bear in engaging in debiasing through law – just as, in a conventional 
“debiasing law” approach, experimentation is necessary to determine the 
appropriate level or scope of the legal response. The problem of the scope of 
a legal corrective is ubiquitous in the law, not specific to strategies for 
debiasing through law.  
 
A second and more fundamental concern, however, involves 
individual autonomy. The point is most obvious with respect to debiasing 
through law in response to the endowment effect, for any determination that 
the excess of individuals’ willingness to accept over their willingness to pay 
is an “error” requiring correction is likely to be controversial to some. Thus, 
debiasing through law in this setting inevitably raises important issues of 
autonomy, as people’s preferences are, in a fundamental sense, indeterminate 
in the presence of the endowment effect. 
 
But even debiasing through law in response to judgment errors raises 
important issues of individual autonomy. In some such cases of debiasing 
through law, government seems to be correcting bounded rationality by 
exploiting it, in a way that might give rise to fears of manipulation. In the 
applications discussed in section 2.1, this occurs most obviously with respect 
to harnessing availability and framing in response to optimism bias. Is this a 
legitimate form of government action? Under what circumstances? 
 
If heuristics and biases are pervasive, then an informed government is 
likely to have little trouble in manipulating people in its preferred directions. 
The problem here is that government should respect its citizens, as 
emphasized, for instance, by the publicity condition in John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice (1971). Government should not engage in acts that it could 
not defend in public to those who are subject to those acts. If a public defense 
could not be made, the acts are an insult to the autonomy of citizens. In our 
applications in section 2.1, however, there is no reason to think government 
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would have to conceal or ambiguate its efforts to correct individuals’ 
judgment errors. 
 
Indeed, government efforts to correct such mistakes are widespread 
and largely uncontroversial; the worry about government “manipulation,” if 
there is a worry, arises even with the widely accepted approach under which 
the government corrects simple information failures (where people are 
mistaken because they lack information entirely, rather than because they 
process information in a biased way) among citizens. As framing effects as 
well as other departures from unbounded rationality reveal, there is usually 
no neutral way to present information. Whenever the government is 
presenting even accurate information, it is making choices about presentation, 
choices that will affect how citizens perceive the reality around them 
(Benartzi and Thaler 1999). Thus, it is far too simple, and behaviorally naive, 
to draw a sharp line between acceptable “provision of information” and 
unacceptable “mind control.” Unless the concern with government 
manipulation is strong enough to suggest that the government should never 
provide information to its citizens (an implausible suggestion), there must be 
some willingness to tolerate the prospect of government influence over 
citizens’ perceptions of reality and the attendant risk of government 
manipulation.  
 
Thus, for instance, if smokers were determined to discount the risks 
that accompany smoking, in part because of optimism bias, it is not obvious 
that government would violate their autonomy by giving a more accurate 
sense of those risks, even if the best way of giving that accurate sense were 
through concrete accounts of suffering. And it is far from clear in such a case 
that the government could not publicly defend its strategy to citizens as 
required by the publicity condition; recall in this connection the American 
Legacy Foundation letters campaign described in section 2.1.1 above.   
 
This is not to say, of course, that no form of debiasing through law in 
response to judgment errors of the sort discussed in section 2.1 could be 
objectionable on autonomy grounds. Some forms might resemble systems of 
propaganda in clear violation of the publicity condition. If so, there is a real 
risk that the one-sidedness and aggressiveness of the government’s effort will 
be exposed. If this happens, public trust will unquestionably be reduced. And 
if trust is reduced, government strategies are much less likely to succeed. 
These instrumental concerns are aggravated by strong moral ones: At least 
when minors are not involved, the law should treat citizens with respect, and 
extreme marketing strategies (going well beyond what we have suggested in 
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discussing strategies for debiasing through law in response to judgment 
errors) violate that principle.  
 
With respect to autonomy, no general conclusion is likely to make 
sense; the nature and force of the objections discussed above will generally 
depend on the setting. However, these objections seem weakest when 
government is responding to a form of bounded rationality that 
unquestionably qualifies as an “error” and is using methods that do not distort 
the facts.  
 
 
3.5 “Behavioral Bureaucrats”   
 
Nothing said thus far denies the important fact that legal policymakers 
and administrators, including those who seek to engage in debiasing through 
law, will often suffer from both inadequate information and bounded 
rationality themselves. No less than ordinary people, bureaucrats use 
heuristics and are subject to predictable biases31; they are also susceptible to 
the influence of powerful private groups with stakes in the outcome. The 
combination of informational failures, cognitive biases, and interest-group 
power can lead government in extremely unfortunate directions (Noll and 
Krier 1990; Kuran and Sunstein 1999). In this light we do not make the naive 
and implausible suggestion that in the real world, strategies for debiasing 
through law will always be well-motivated and well-designed. (Nor will their 
“debiasing law” counterpart strategies.) Our claim is only that if people 
exhibit bounded rationality, debiasing through law may often be a promising 
response – one that it would be foolish to eliminate from the government’s 
repertoire. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The central goal of this paper has been to draw attention to the broad 
importance of debiasing through law. The social science literature has 
devoted a great deal of effort to the study of debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors, but with little effort to see how law and legal institutions might 
accomplish it. Those interested in bounded rationality and law have argued 
mostly that legal institutions should be insulated from the effects of 
                                                 
31 For a general discussion of “behavioral bureaucrats,” see Jolls, Sunstein 
and Thaler (1998:1543-44). 
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boundedly rational behavior, and in some cases that debiasing of boundedly 
rational actors should be pursued through changes in procedural rules 
governing the adjudicative process. In our view, debiasing through law – 
especially debiasing through substantive law – is a distinctive and sometimes 
far preferable alternative to the strategy of insulating legal outcomes from the 
effects of bounded rationality. Such debiasing – distinct from the more 
familiar approach of attempting to control behavior through incentives –  
often promises to be both more successful and less invasive than the more 
standard alternatives.  
 
 From the normative point of view, we have emphasized that many 
forms of debiasing through law may be seen as a distinctive kind of 
informational regulation. In many cases, the major questions are standard: 
whether such efforts are effective and whether their benefits justify their 
costs.  
 
 Nothing in our analysis is inconsistent with the claim that in some 
contexts unfettered markets are the best response to bounded rationality. Such 
markets might reduce the effects of bounded rationality by raising the stakes, 
as noted above32; it is also possible that the costs of boundedly rational 
behavior are, in some contexts, lower than the costs of any effort to 
counteract it. We also do not disagree with the now-familiar suggestion that 
in the face of bounded rationality, aggressive regulation – some form of 
“debiasing law” – might sometimes be justified.33 Instead our aim in this 
paper has been to chart the possibility of a middle course, one that asks legal 
institutions not to ignore people, but instead to reduce their bounded 
rationality. In some contexts, debiasing through law is likely to be effective, 
cost-justified, and minimally intrusive. We believe that some areas of the law 
reveal an appreciation of these points and hence an implicit behavioral 
rationality, using legal strategies as a mechanism for debiasing of boundedly 
rational actors. Our principal goal has been to understand those strategies in 
these terms and to explore the possibility of building on them to do more.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 But for an entertaining demonstration of the persistence of bounded 
rationality amidst high stakes, see Lewis (2003). 
33 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998) provide various examples. 
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Appendix:  Debiasing of Boundedly Rational Actors Through 
Procedural Rules and Substantive Law 
 
 This appendix briefly summarizes some leading empirical research 
on debiasing of boundedly rational actors and its implications for debiasing 
through law. 
 
 Evidence of 
unsuccessful 
debiasing? 
Evidence of 
successful 
debiasing? 
Illustration of 
debiasing 
through 
procedural 
rules? 
Illustration of 
debiasing 
through 
substantive 
law? 
JUDGMENT 
ERRORS 
    
1. Hindsight 
bias 
Almost all 
approaches 
Source: 
Fischhoff 
(1982). 
Telling people 
not to be 
“Monday 
morning 
quarterbacks.” 
Source: 
Stallard and 
Worthington 
(1998). 
Requiring 
judges to 
instruct jurors 
not to be 
“Monday 
morning 
quarterbacks.”  
Source: Peters 
(1999). 
 
2. Self-serving 
bias 
Alerting 
people to 
existence of 
the bias  
Source: 
Babcock, 
Loewenstein 
and 
Issacharoff 
(1997). 
Asking people 
to make other 
side’s 
argument. 
Source: 
Babcock, 
Loewenstein 
and 
Issacharoff 
(1997). 
Requiring 
litigants to 
make other 
side’s 
argument. 
Source: 
Babcock, 
Loewenstein 
and 
Issacharoff 
(1997). 
 
3. Optimism 
bias 
Almost all 
approaches 
that directly 
target 
optimism bias. 
Source: 
Weinstein and 
Klein (2002). 
 
Giving people 
a vivid sense 
of the relevant 
harms 
Source: Sloan, 
Taylor and 
Smith (2003). 
 
 Consumer 
safety law 
governing 
warnings 
(section 
2.1.1). 
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 Evidence of 
unsuccessful 
debiasing? 
Evidence of 
successful 
debiasing? 
Illustration of 
debiasing 
through 
procedural 
rules? 
Illustration of 
debiasing 
through 
substantive 
law? 
DEPARTURES 
FROM 
EXPECTED 
UTILITY 
THEORY 
    
Endowment 
effect 
Almost all 
approaches. 
Source: 
Kahneman, 
Knetsch and 
Thaler (1990). 
Protecting  
entitlements 
by liability 
rule rather than 
property rule; 
having agents 
make 
decisions.  
Sources: 
Rachlinski and 
Jourden 
(1998); Arlen, 
Spitzer and 
Talley (2002). 
 Property law 
governing 
remedies 
(section 
2.2.1); 
agency law 
(section 
2.2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 csunstei@uchicago.edu 
  
 
42
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
1.  William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other Unpublished 
Works: An Economic Approach (July 1991) 
2.  Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom 
in the Law of Tort (August 1991) 
3.  Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September 1991) 
4.  Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February 1992) 
5.  Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools (February 
1992) 
6.  Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of AIDS (April 1992) 
7.  Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992) 
8.  William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July 
1992) 
9.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A 
Quantitative Study (August 1992) 
10.  Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey 
With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September 1992) 
11.  Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts (November 1992) 
12.  Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January 1993) 
13.  J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning 
Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993) 
14.  Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (April 1993) 
15.  Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everyone Else Does) (April 1993) 
16.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial 
Entrenchment, and Firm‐Specific Human Capital (August 1993) 
17.  J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the 
Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993) 
18.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory 
Adjudication (September 1993) 
19.  Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (September 1993) 
20.  Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis (October 1993) 
21.  Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle (March 1994) 
22.  Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law (June 1994) 
23.  William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis (June 1994) 
24.  J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan 
(August 1994) 
25.  Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (August 1994) 
26.  Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property 
Protection of Software (August 1994) 
27.  Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994) 
28.  David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (December 
1994) 
  
 
43
29.  Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime 
Consumption (January 1995) 
30.  Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages (February 1995) 
31.  Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Explaining Deviations from 
the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation (March 1995) 
32.  Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business 
Enterprise (April 1995) 
33.  Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995) 
34.  J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995) 
35.  Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology 
(November 1995) 
36.  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January 1996) 
37.  J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law 
Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (January 1996) 
38.  Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences 
Make Good Neighbors? (March 1996) 
39.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost‐Benefit State (May 1996) 
40.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over 
the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles (July 1996) 
41.  John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry 
Concealed Handguns (August 1996) 
42.  Cass R. Sunstein, Health‐Health Tradeoffs (September 1996) 
43.  G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics 
of Financially Distressed Firms (March 1997) 
44.  Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March 1997) 
45.  William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay 
(March 1997) 
46.  Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997) 
47.  John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: 
Evidence from California’s State Legislative Races (May 1997) 
48.  Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the 
Adoption of Norms (June 1997) 
49.  Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through the 
Lens of Laissez‐Faire (August 1997)  
50.  Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (December 1997)  
51.  William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998)  
52.  John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are 
Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger (February 1998)  
53.   Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis 
of Law (March 1998)  
54.  Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998)  
55.  Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics (May 1998) 
  
 
44
56.  John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action, 
Police Departments, and Crime (May 1998) 
57.  Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann‐Margalit, Second‐Order Decisions (June 1998) 
58.  Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determinants, 
Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional 
Attempts to Limit Awards (July 1998) 
59.  Kenneth W. Dam, Self‐Help in the Digital Jungle (August 1998) 
60.  John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and 
Scope of Government? (September 1998) 
61.  Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 
1998) 
62.  David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law 
(November 1998) 
63.  Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law 
(November 1998) 
64.  John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December 
1998) 
65.  Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A 
“Third Way” (January 1999) 
66.  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February 1999) 
67.  Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods 
(February 1999) 
68.  Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February 1999) 
69.  Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with 
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999) 
70.  Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999) 
71.  Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine, Environmental 
Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999) 
72.  Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost‐Benefit Analysis (April 1999) 
73.  John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shooting, Bombings, 
and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law 
Enforcement (April 1999)  
74.  Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study (May 1999) 
75.  Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again 
(May 1999) 
76.  William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz 
Collection (May 1999) 
77.  Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal 
Deterrence? (June 1999) 
78.  Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long‐Run Growth in Obesity as a 
Function of Technological Change (June 1999) 
79.  David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999) 
80.  Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error 
(August 1999) 
81.  David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic than 
Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September 1999) 
  
 
45
82.  Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999) 
83.  Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Law and Economics (September 1999) 
84.  Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel (October 1999) 
85.  Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost‐Benefit Analysis (October 1999) 
86.  Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal 
Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October 1999) 
87.  Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market 
Signaling of Personal Characteristics (November 1999) 
88.  Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost‐Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted (November 1999) 
89.  Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and 
Satire (November 1999) 
90.  David A. Weisbach, Should the Tax Law Require Current Accrual of Interest on 
Derivative Financial Instruments? (December 1999) 
91.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999) 
92.  Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000) 
93.  Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and 
Complexity in Contracts (January 2000)  
94.  Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost 
(February 2000)  
95.  David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars: The 
Severity Shift (February 2000) 
96.  Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with 
Special Reference to Sanctions (March 2000) 
97.  Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies (April 2000)  
98.  Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann‐Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May 2000) 
99.  David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti‐Tax Avoidance Laws (May 2000, 
revised May 2002)  
100.  Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work (June 2000)  
101.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000) 
102.  Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost‐Benefit Analysis and Relative Position 
(August 2000)  
103.  Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions (September 2000)  
104.  Cass R. Sunstein, Cost‐Benefit Default Principles (October 2000)  
105.  Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes,  The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet 
(November 2000) 
106.  Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (November 2000) 
107.  Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent 
System (November 2000) 
108.  Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International 
Relations:  A Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000) 
109.  William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000) 
110.  Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000) 
111.  Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December 2000) 
  
 
46
112.  Richard A. Epstein and Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious 
Liability, Class Actions and the Patient’s Bill of Rights (December 2000) 
113.  William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art:  An 
Economic Approach (December 2000) 
114.  Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule (January 2001) 
115.  George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital 
(January 2001) 
116.  Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (February 2001) 
117.  Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance 
(February 2001) 
118.  Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Fads and Fashions (with Special Reference to Law) 
(March 2001) 
119.  Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost‐Benefit Analysis:  A Positive Political 
Theory Perspective (April 2001) 
120.  Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale?  Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age 
(April 2001) 
121.  Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganization (April 2001) 
122.  David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters (May 2001) 
123.  William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished? 
(May 2001) 
124.  Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights?  Lessons from South Africa (May 
2001) 
125.  Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, The Market 
for Federal Judicial Law Clerks (June 2001)    
126.  Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making (June 2001) 
127.  Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks after ATA (June 2001) 
128.    Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear (June 2001) 
129.  Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution:  The Hidden Perils of Property 
Transfer (July 2001) 
130.  Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft:  The Declining Need for 
Centralized Coordination in a Networked World (July 2001) 
131.    Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments (July 2001) 
132.  Eric A. Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts (August 2001) 
133.  Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions (August 2001) 
134.  Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of  the Commons: Parking and Stopping on  the 
Commons (August 2001) 
135.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (September 2001) 
136.  Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of Property 
Exemption Laws (September 2001) 
137.  Eric A. Posner and George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an 
Incomplete Contracts Perspective (September 2001) 
138.  Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law (November 
2001) 
  
 
47
139.  Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board 
Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending (December 2001)   
140.  Alan O. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
“Solution” (February 2002) 
141.  Edna Ullmann‐Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation (February 
2002) 
142.  Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq 
v. Commissioner (February 2002) (Published in Tax Notes, January 28, 2002) 
143.  Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (March 2002, Journal of Legal 
Studies 2002) 
144.  Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy:  Its Unintended and Intended Consequences 
(March 2002, forthcoming Cato Journal, summer 2002) 
145.  David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes (March 2002, Texas Law 
Review) 
146.  Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:  Success or 
Failure (March 2002) 
147.  Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy:  The Case of Digital Distribution (April 
2002, The Antitrust Bulletin) 
148.  David A. Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (April 2002, 
Coase Lecture February 2002) 
149.  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (April 2002) 
150.  Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost‐Benefit Analysis (April 2002) 
151.  Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (May 2002, updated January 
2003) 
152.  Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (May 
2002; revised March 2003) 
153.  Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002) 
154.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (July 
2002) 
155.  Anne Gron and Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the 
Government as Insurer? (July 2002) 
156.  Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002) 
157.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002) 
158.  Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law (with 
Notes on Interpretive Theory) (August 2002) 
159.  Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright (September 2002) 
160.  Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War (September 2002) 
161  Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for 
Tort and Contract Law (September 2002) 
162.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File‐Swapping Networks (September 2002) 
163.  David A. Weisbach, Does the X‐Tax Mark the Spot? (September 2002) 
164.  Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (September 2002) 
  
 
48
165.  Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (October 2002) 
166.  Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief (October 
2002) 
167.  Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom (November 2002) 
168.  Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November 
2002) 
169.  Avraham D. Tabbach, Criminal Behavior: Sanctions and Income Taxation: An 
Economic Analysis (November 2002) 
170.  Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of “Old” Public Health: The Legal Framework for the 
Regulation of Public Health (December 2002) 
171.  Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (December 2002) 
172.  David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk‐Taking with Multiple Tax Rates (December 
2002) 
173.  Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy (December 2002) 
174.  Richard A. Epstein, Into the Frying Pan: Standing and Privity under the Telecom‐
munications Act of 1996 and Beyond (December 2002) 
175.  Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003) 
176.  David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short‐
Term Assets (January 2003) 
177.  Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come 
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act? (January 2003) 
178.  Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: 
Iowa Utilities and Verizon (January 2003) 
179.  William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright 
Infringement: An Economic Perspective (February 2003) 
180.  Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003) 
181.  Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003) 
182.  Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion (April 
2003) 
183.  Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 2003) 
184.  Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost‐Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003) 
185.  Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an 
Oxymoron (May 2003) 
186.  Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (May 2003) 
187.  Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 2003) 
188.  Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective 
(May 2003) 
189.  Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003) 
190.  Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional 
Protection (June 2003) 
191.   Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life‐Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003) 
192.  Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems 
(July 2003) 
193.  Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003) 
194.  David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs (September 2003) 
  
 
49
195.  William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Memories: 
What Was the Standard of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids to Women in 
Preterm Labor between 1985 and 2000? (September 2003) 
196.  Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, 
and Marriage (September 2003) 
197.  Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content 
(September 2003) 
198.  Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)  
199.  Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income Producing Crimes with 
Variable Leisure Time (October 2003) 
200.  Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003) 
201.  Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003) 
202.  David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004) 
203.  David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004) 
204.  Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright 
Law (April 2004) 
205.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004) 
206.  Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 
2004) 
207.  Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the 
Value of Statistical Lives (February 2004) 
208.  Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A 
Critique of the Institute of Medicine Study (March 2004) 
209.  Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for 
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch‐Waxman (March 2004) 
210.  Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004) 
211.  Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004) 
212.  Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute 
(May 2004) 
213.  Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The 
Division of Labor within and between Law Firms (April 2004) 
214.  Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the 
Utilization of Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry 
(April 2004) 
215.  James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the 
Market for Underwriting Business (July 2004) 
216.  Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004) 
217.  Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable 
(July 2004) 
218.  Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Company Stock, Market Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004) 
219.  Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information 
Markets (August 2004) 
220.   Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross‐
Cultural Risk Perceptions (August 2004) 
  
 
50
221.  M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Herroin: A Defense of Perks 
(August 2004) 
222.  Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004) 
223.  Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogenity and Autarky (August 2004) 
224.  Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope‐of‐Permission Goods: When Should We Invest 
in Reducing Entry Barriers? (September 2004) 
225.  Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004) 
 
 
